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COMMENT
GOOD FAITH MEDIATION: IMPROVING
EFFICIENCY, COST, AND SATISFACTION IN
NORTH CAROLINA'S PRE-TRIAL PROCESS
One thing I supplicate your majesty; that you will give orders,
under a great penalty, that no bachelors of law should be allowed
to come here [to the new world]; for not only are they bad them-
selves, but they also make and contrive a thousand iniquities.
- Vasco Nufiez de Balboa, to King Ferdinand V of Spain, 15131
That meanness, that infernal knavery, which multiplies needless
litigations, which retards the operation of justice, which, from
court to court, upon the most trifling pretence, postpones trial to
glean the last emptyings of a client's pocket, for unjust fees of
everlasting attendance, which artfully twists the meaning of law
to the side we espouse, which seizes unwarrantable advantages
from the prepossessions, ignorance, interests, and prejudices of a
jury, you will shun rather than death or infamy.
- Timothy Dwight, president of Yale College, addressing the
graduating class of 17762
Dissatisfaction with the legal profession's role in dispute reso-
lution is as old as the profession itself.3 It is disturbing that
although the rule of law is the hallmark of advanced societies, the
individuals dedicated to the mechanisms of justice have long been
vilified. Though many of the characteristics for which "society"
condemns lawyers are the same characteristics for which "citi-
zens" pay top dollar in resolving their own disputes, there is a
growing movement toward legal reform.
One problem is "the perception that lawyers instigate litiga-
tion rather than promot[e] amicable solutions and fair and just
1. JESS M. BRALLIER, LAWYERS AND OTHER REPTILES 63 (1992).
2. Id. at 90-91.
3. Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal
Profession, 68 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 85, 86 (1994).
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settlements. As a result, lawyers are regarded as instigators of
strife and not as peacemakers and problem solvers."4 Not surpris-
ingly, lawyers have thus been blamed for a "litigation explosion."5
This societal attitude is based in part on exaggerations of the law-
yer's common law duty to zealously advocate for the client.6 Many
jurisdictions have responded by adopting alternative mechanisms
of dispute resolution which promote negotiation, conciliation and
compromise. One such mechanism is based on the concept of
mediation.
The issue this comment addresses is whether a court, in com-
pelling parties to mediate, should also require the parties to act
honestly and reasonably in attempting to resolve their disputes.
Creating and enforcing a duty of good faith in mediation confer-
ences would decrease costs and improve the efficiency of litigation.
The purpose of this comment is to promote a duty of good faith in
civil cases directed to mediated settlement conferences in North
Carolina superior courts. This comment discusses the foundation
for the duty and suggests a procedure for enforcement. v
4. Id. at 105. "Many of the most successful trial lawyers are driven by an
overriding desire to win - preferably in a way that makes the enemy's defeat
most public and unmistakable. Listening to someone else's views, understanding
someone else's interests, solving someone else's problems - these essential
aspects of settlement are likely to rank fairly lowly on the litigator's list of fun
ways to spend a busy day." Paul J. Mode & Deanne C. Siemer, The Litigation
Partner and the Settlement Partner, 12 LITIG. No. 4 at 33, 34 (1986).
5. Re, supra note 3, at 107.
6. Id. at 91. At the beginning of this century, Dean Pound identified this
problem as the "Sporting Theory of Justice." Roscoe Pound, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 395,
404-06 (1906).
7. This comment is not intended to address the fundamentals of mediation.
For an overview of mediation in North Carolina, see STEVEN H. CLARKE ET AL.,
COURT-ORDERED CIVIL CASE MEDIATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF
ITS EFFECTS (1995); JACK P. ETHERIDGE, COMING To THE TABLE, A GUIDE To
MEDIATION IN NORTH CAROLINA (1994); Lex K. Larson, Mediation Of Industrial
Commission Cases, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 395 (1995);. John G. Mebane III,
Comment, An End To Settlement On The Courthouse Steps? Mediated
Settlement Conferences In North Carolina Superior Courts, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1857
(1993). For an in depth review of mediation related law and social science
research, see NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW POLICY
PRACTICE (2d ed. 1994). For guidance on negotiation, see STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG
ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1992); ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING To YES
(1991); ROGER FISHER & SCOTT BROWN, GETTING TOGETHER (1988).
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I. OVERVIEW
A. The Evolution of Mediation In the United States
Mediation first became popular in the United States at the
end of the nineteenth century when it was used to resolve difficult
conflicts between labor and management.8 Lawmakers enacted
mediation legislation as a resolution for failed labor negotiations
and strikes. This legislation was not intended as an alternative to
adjudication.9 Instead, it was a tool to prevent social disruption. 10
During the early decades of this century, however, attorneys
and judges recognized that mediation could be a cost-effective and
conciliatory option to adjudication." For example, domestic rela-
tion courts relied increasingly on mediation to address the rising
divorce litigation of the post-war 1940's and 1950's.12 In the
1960's, the American Arbitration Association and other organiza-
tions promoted privately funded mediation efforts."s In 1972, the
United States Department of Justice initiated mediation mecha-
nisms to resolve civil rights disputes. Congress fully funded the
program as a means to reduce discriminatory practices and pro-
mote racial harmony.' 4
Beginning in the 1970's, as caseloads began to increase, con-
flict and dispute resolution methods gained widespread atten-
tion.' 5 Commentators, judges and policy-makers began promoting
mediation for different purposes. 16 Advocates argue that media-
tion streamlines case processing, provides quicker and more effi-
8. ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 7, § 5:01, at 1.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id. at 2 & nn. 6-8. At a 1923 American Bar Association meeting, speakers
recognized the improved speed, cost, accessibility, satisfaction and fairness that
conciliation offered to the adjudication process. A.B.A. J. 746-51 (1923).
12. ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 7, § 5:01, at 5-6.
13. Id. at 3 & n.11
14. Id. at 3-4.
15. Id. at § 5:02.
16. See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. 274 (March
1982). But see Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods
of Alternative Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366
(1986). Making settlement cheaper is not the solution to reducing the caseload
crisis; it would be more effective
to make the parties bear a larger fraction of the total costs of trial,
including queuing costs that trials impose on other parties. . . More
realistic filing fees would be a simpler as well as more efficacious method
of dealing with the caseload crisis than new ways of inducing people to
settle lawsuits before trial.
1996] 283
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cient resolutions, and increases access to the judicial system by
making adjudication more accommodating. 7 Further, mediated
remedies require less post-judgment motions for enforcement.
Others believe that mediation presents better remedies and
standards of decisions.18 This process is well fitted for parties
with long-term relationships or complex conflicts.' 9 Mediation can
promote the exchange of information and perspectives, provide an
opportunity for emotional venting, stimulate creative settlements
and can reveal each party's fundamental interests.2 0 Many
mediators have reported parties settling nearly unresolvable con-
flicts after one party simply apologized.21
Some see mediation as a mechanism that allows parties to
take control of their disputes without dependence on attorneys
and the courts.22 Still others view mediation as a tool for rebuild-
ing communities. 23 As mediation becomes increasingly popular,
lawmakers choose among these different policy objectives in
implementing mediation processes.
B. North Carolina
In 1983 when the General Assembly established and funded a
child custody and visitation mediation pilot program, North Caro-
lina joined the national trend favoring alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR).24 This program was established on a state wide basis
in 1989.25 In the early 1990's, a planning committee began a
study for a process of court-ordered mediation. The committee's
directive was to provide a system which would dispose of cases in
a more efficient manner while proving more satisfactory to the liti-
Id. at 393. See also Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law:
Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1 (1993). ADR movement trades justice for harmony, and
is premised on the "litigation explosion," which is a baseless ideological
construction. This false premise was and is left unchallenged because of intense
influence and mind colonization.
17. ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 7, § 5:02, at 4-6.
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id.
20. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 7, at 103.
21. Id. at 137-39.
22. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 7, § 5:02, at 6.
23. Id. at 6-7.
24. ETHERIDGE, supra note 7, at 253-54.
25. Id. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-494 (1995) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1
(1995).
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gants.26 In 1991, the General Assembly authorized a pilot pro-
gram for court-ordered mediated settlement conferences for civil
cases filed in Superior Court .2  The Administrative Office of the
Courts (AOC) was directed to evaluate whether the program made
operation of the superior courts "more efficient, less costly, and
more satisfying to the litigants."28
The AOC requested the Institute of Government (IOG) to
carry out a study evaluating the mediated settlement conference
(MSC) program.29 The IOG discovered that only 65.8 percent of
cases receivinge°MSC orders31 actually went to mediation.12 Par-
ticipants were generally satisfied with their mediated conference,
although there was no increased satisfaction with the entire law-
suit experience. 3 The program was only marginally successful in
achieving greater efficiency. 4 The IOG suggested that settlement
rates, efficiency, and lower costs could be enhanced by procedures
26. CLARKE ET AL., supra note 7, at 1.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38 (Supp. 1989 & 1991).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1(a) (1995).
Purpose. The General Assembly finds that a system of court-ordered
mediated settlement conferences should be established to facilitate the
settlement of superior court civil actions and to make civil litigation
more economical, efficient, and satisfactory to litigants and the State.
Therefore, this section is enacted to require parties to superior court
civil actions and their representatives to attend a pretrial, mediated
settlement conference conducted pursuant to this section and pursuant
to rules of the Supreme Court adopted to implement this section.
29. "'Mediated settlement conference' means a pretrial, court-ordered
conference of the parties to a civil action and their representatives conducted by
a mediator." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1(b)(1) (1995).
30. CLARKE ET AL., supra note 7, at 26.
31. Order by Senior Resident Superior Court Judge. The Senior Resident
Superior Court Judge of any district, or part thereof, authorized to
participate in the mediated settlement conference program may, by
written order, require all persons and entities identified in Rule 4 to
attend a pre-trial mediated settlement conference in any civil action
except an action in which a party is seeking the issuance of an
extraordinary writ or is appealing the revocation of a motor vehicle
operator's license.
N.C. Rules of Mediated Settlement Conferences Rule L.A. (1) (1995).
32. CLARKE ET AL., supra note 7, at 26. The IOG found that of all the cases,
only 49% went to MSCs. The courts did not order MSCs in 25.5% of the cases.
Id. The statute does not mandate that all cases go to MSCs, and the rules give
judges discretion in ordering cases, but the program's planners anticipated that
most cases would receive orders and attend MSCs.
33. Id. at 42-44.
34. Id at 44-46.
1996] 285
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that would more quickly direct a greater number of cases to medi-
ation.35 The IOG recommended stricter rules and more vigorous
case management 36.
On July 27, 1995, the General Assembly enacted North Caro-
lina General Statutes § 7A-38.1, which established the program
on a permanent, state-wide basis. 37  The General Assembly
included mandatory prelitigation mediation of farm nuisance dis-
putes which had not been included in the pilot program,39 and
authorized a mediation program in the Office of Administrative
Hearings.4 °
On September 7, 1995, the North Carolina Supreme Court
promulgated amended rules for MSCs. Instead of acting on the
recommendations of the IOG and requiring quicker direction to
mediation, the amended rules require parties to wait even longer
before attending an MSC. 41 The issue of case management is not
35. Id. at 56-58.
36. Id.
37. "Statewide implementation. Mediated settlement conferences authorized
by this section shall be implemented in all judicial districts as soon as
practicable, as determined by the Director of the Administrative Office of the
Courts." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1(d) (1995).
38. For insights into farm mediation statutes, see Contemporary Studies
Project, The Iowa Mediation Service: An Empirical Study of Iowa Attorneys'
Views on Mandatory Farm Mediation, 79 IowA L. REV. 653 (1994).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.3(c) (1995):
Mandatory Mediation. Prior to bringing a civil action involving a farm
nuisance dispute, a farm resident or any other party shall initiate
mediation pursuant to this section. If a farm resident or any other party
brings an action involving a farm nuisance dispute, this action shall,
upon motion of any party prior to trial, be dismissed without prejudice
by the court unless any one or more of the following apply: (1) The
dispute involves a claim that has been brought as a class action. (2) The
nonmoving party has satisfied the requirements of this section and such
is indicated in a mediator's certification issued under subsection (g) of
this section. (3) The court finds that a mediator improperly failed to
issue a certification indicating that the nonmoving party satisfied the
requirements' of this section. (4) The court finds good cause for a failure
to attempt mediation. Good cause includes, but is not limited to, a
determination that the time delay required for mediation would likely
result in irreparable harm or that injunctive relief is otherwise
warranted.
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-23.1 (1995).
41. ". . . The court's order issued pursuant to Rule 1(b) shall clearly state a
date of completion for the conference. Said date shall not be less than 90 days
nor more than 180 days after issuance of the court's order." N.C. RULES OF
MEDIATED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES Rule 3.B. (1993) (emphasis added). "...
286 [Vol. 18:281
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addressed. There is also no requirement within the rules for par-
ties in a mediated settlement conference to act in good faith.
C. Criticisms of Mandatory Mediation
Critics of mandatory mediation are concerned that these
alternative mechanisms are being co-opted and blunted by the
status-quo institutions which the mechanisms originally chal-
lenged.4 2 Alternative dispute mechanisms were considered valua-
ble because they provided an "alternative" to the established
methods of conflict resolutions. Disputants were no longer con-
fined to the rules, procedures, advocacy and formalism of govern-
ment courts. Alternative dispute resolution appeared confined
only by the imaginations and goals of the participants. When
mediation is institutionalized, it is controlled by legal profession-
als who import legal procedure and definitions. Mediators are
standardized43 and volume increases." Some fear that these fac-
tors threaten to routinize and dehumanize the process, create
pressures for "acceptable" outcomes, and destroy self-determina-
tion.4 5 In short, mediation may simply become another step in the
adversarial pre-litigation process.
The court's order issued pursuant to Rule 1.A.(1) shall state a date of completion
for the conference which shall be not less than 120 days nor more than 180 days
after issuance of the court's order." N.C. RuLEs OF MEDIATED SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCES Rule 3.B. (1995) (emphasis added).
42. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement In An Adversary Culture: A
Tale of Innovation Co-Opted Or 'The Law Of ADR", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3
(1991). James Alfini et al., What Happens When Mediation Is Institutionalized?:
To The Parties, Practitioners, and Host Institutions, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 307, 309-10 (1994) (Quoting professor Baruch Bush).
43. N.C. RuLEs OF MEDIATED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES Rule 8 (1995) states
the prerequisites for being a MSC mediator. The mediator must have completed
a 40 hour training program approved by the Dispute Resolution Commission
(DRC), Rule 8.A. Attorneys must be members of the North Carolina State Bar
with 5 years experience. Rule 8.B. It is possible for a non-attorney to qualify.
The requirements are 20 additional hours of mediation training, acceptable to
the DRC, followed by 5 years experience, in which the person mediated at least
12 cases each year for at least 20 hours each year, an additional six hours
training in procedure, terminology, ethics and confidentiality by a trainer
certified by the DRC, three letters of recommendation to the DRC, and a four
year college degree. Id. These requirements should ensure that nearly all
mediators in the MSC process are attorneys and members of the state bar. Rule
8 contains six additional requirements for attorneys and non-attorneys.
44. Alfini et al., supra note 42, at 309-13 (Quoting Professor Baruch Bush and
Professor Carol Liebman).
45. Id.
1996] 287
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Another concern is that mandatory mediation will decrease
judicial efficiency and increase costs. Satellite litigation may be
instituted upon a belief that the opposing party failed to properly
mediate.46 Drawing lessons from the 1983 amendment to Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, high penalties combined
with unclear definitions of what constitutes compliance encour-
ages parties to seek sanctions.47 These costs could exceed the sav-
ings that result from additional and quicker settlements.
An early concern was that informal dispute resolution proce-
dures would become second class courtrooms for the poor.48 Indi-
viduals across the entire economic spectrum have, however,
adopted ADR mechanisms. The criticism is now that the proce-
dures favor the rich 49 and prejudice employees. 50 It has also been
claimed that court-mandated ADR is a violation of the Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 51
46. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 7, § 7:03 at 13.
47. Id. at 14 & n.19. The experience of Rule 11 "cautions against adding
substantial sanctions at the same time that more than mere attendance at
mediation (and, when applicable, payment of a fee) is required." The Society for
Professionals in Dispute Resolution recommend that
[c]oercion to settle in the form of reports to the trier of fact and of
financial disincentives to trial should not be used in connection with
mandated mediation. In connection with court-annexed arbitration, the
financial disincentives should be clear, commensurate with the interests
at stake, and used only when the parties can afford to risk their
imposition and proceed to trial.
The Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Mandated Participation and
Settlement Coercion, ARBITRATION J, Mar. 1991, at 38. Reports concerning the
substance of mediation should not be sent to the trier of fact, however, incentives
to use the process for its intended purpose and to negotiate in good faith should
not be confused as a disincentive to trial. Trial should be the natural result of
two parties that can not in good faith reconcile their differences. "As a policy
matter, it is important to distinguish settlement pressures from sanctions for
vexatious or frivolous conduct in litigation and from provisions shifting
attorney's fees to the losing party. Unlike these penalties, settlement pressures
also punish the party with a meritorious claim." ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note
7, § 7:05 at 22-23. The financial disincentives to abusing the process and
negotiating in bad faith should also be clear and commensurate with the
additional costs such conduct imposes. See discussion infra parts II.B. and II.C.
48. ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 7, § 5:03 at 11.
49. Id. William R. Wilson Jr., Only Voluntary ADR Programs Ensure
Constitutional Rights, NAT'L L.J., April 11, 1994, at C6.
50. Micheal Yablonski, ADR Backlash, LrnG. NEws, February / March 1995,
at 1, 4.
51. Wilson, supra note 49, at 34. This is questionable. Since 1938, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have authorized federal judges to require
8
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D. Brothers get Run Over by a Mediation Mack Truck
The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently confronted its
first § 7A-38 litigation. In 1990, Clement Brothers entered into a
contract to buy two new Mack trucks from Blue Ridge Mack Sales
and Service, Inc. (Blue Ridge).52 When Blue Ridge tendered the
two trucks for delivery, Clement Brothers refused to accept.53
Blue Ridge subsequently merged into Triad Mack Sales and Ser-
vice, Inc. (Triad Mack), and filed a claim for breach of contract
against Clement Brothers.54 June 26 1992, Judge J.D. DeRamus
entered an order for a mediated settlement conference pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 7A-38, which required both parties to send "a represen-
tative (officer, director, employee, or in-house counsel) with full
authority to settle the claim. . . ."55 Triad Mack was represented
by its attorney and president; Clement Brothers was represented
by outside counsel who had no settlement authority.5 6 The confer-
ence made no progress toward settlement. 57
Triad Mack filed a motion to sanction Clement Brothers for
their failure to comply with the MSC order by not sending a repre-
sentative with authority to settle .5  At the subsequent hearing,
parties' attendance at pre-trial conferences. FED. R. Ciy. P. 16. Since the 1983
amendments, the rules specify that parties can be compelled to attend in order to
facilitate settlement. Id. A party may also be sanctioned for failing to
participate in good faith at the pre-trial conference. Id. See Francis v. Women's
Obstetrics and Gynecology Group, P.C., 144 F.R.D. 646 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)
(Sanctioning party under Rule 16 for failure to prepare for pre-trial conference
and failure to act in good faith.). See also Department of Transp. v. City of
Atlanta, 259 Ga. 305, 309, 380 S.E.2d 265, 269 (1989) (J. Clarke, concurring.)
(Discussing requiring good faith efforts in mediation, and state Constitution's
reference to "speedy, efficient and effective resolution of disputes" points courts
in the direction of using mediation.) Courts have long upheld the
constitutionality of mandatory pre-trial requirements. For a review of cases
finding pre-trial conference requirements valid in other contexts see: Kristine C.
Karnezis, Annotation, Validity and Construction of State Statutory Provisions
Relating To Limitations In Amount of Recovery In Medical Malpractice Claim
and Submission Of Such Claim To Pretrial Panel, 80 A.L.R.3d 583 (1977); Gavin
L. Phillips, Annotation, Mortgage Foreclosure Forbearance Statutes - Modem
Status, 83 A.L.R.4th 243 (1991).
52. Triad Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. Clement Bros. Co., 113 N.C. App. 405,
406, 438 S.E.2d 485, 486 (1994).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 406-07, 438 S.E.2d at 486.
56. Id. at 407, 438 S.E.2d at 486-87.
57. Id. at 407, 438 S.E.2d at 487.
58. Id.
19961 289
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the attorney for Clement Brothers offered an unsworn statement
that he failed to attend because the company president was ill and
all other officers, directors, and employees were outside the
state. 59 Judge DeRamus found that there was no good cause for
Clement Brothers' failure to attend and entered an order striking
their answer." The judge entered a default order against Clement
Brothers.6 1
Prior to final judgment, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
granted an interlocutory appeal. 62 The Court of Appeals held that
the trial court's order was in compliance with the mediation stat-
ute and relevant court rules.6 3 The Court of Appeals held that it
was immaterial that the failure to attend did not prejudice Triad
Mack.64 Because the unsworn statement by Clement's attorney
was not admissible as evidence, the record supported a finding of
no good cause for the failure to attend.6 5 Even though there were
less drastic sanctions available,66 the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by its severe sanctions7.6  The trial court correctly found
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 408, 438 S.E.2d 487.
63. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1(f) (1989 & Supp.) requires:
Attendance of parties. The parties to a superior court civil action which
a mediated settlement conference is ordered, their attorneys and other
persons or entities with authority, by law or contract, to settle the
parties' claims shall attend the mediated settlement conference unless
excused by rules of the Supreme Court or by order of the senior resident
superior court judge. Nothing in this section shall require any party or
other participant in the conference to make a settlement offer or demand
which it deems is contrary to its best interests.
All individual parties and an attorney of record for each party must attend the
MSC. An officer, employee or agent of a non-natural party with authority to
settle must attend. Representatives of liability insurance companies involved
must also attend and have authority to make a decision on behalf of the carrier
or be able to "promptly communicate during the conference with persons who
have such-decision making authority." N.C. RULES OF MEDIATED SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCES Rule 4 (1995).
64. Triad Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. Clement Bros. Co., 113 N.C. App. 405,
409, 438 S.E.2d 485, 488.
65. Id.
66. Rule 37 (b)(2)(C) lists as sanctions: "An order striking out pleadings or
parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or
dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering judgment
by default against the disobedient party;" N.C. R. CIv. P. 37.
67. Triad, 113 N.C. App. at 409, 438 S.E.2d at 488.
290 [Vol. 18:281
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that Clement Brothers lacked good cause for their failure to
attend and the order reflected that less severe sanctions were con-
sidered and rejected. 68 The sanctions entered are specifically
authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)c. 69
This case is valuable as an indicator of future litigation and
the questions the courts will be faced with.70 In Triad Mack,
Clement Brothers violated the plain language of the court-order
and of the Rules Implementing Mediated Settlement Conferences.
The sanctions were also clearly allowed by the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure. Despite clear rules, the losing party
sought and was granted an appeal. The objectives of § 7A-38 were
frustrated. Costs increased and efficiency decreased. If parties
will pursue costly and time consuming appeals to contest issues
that the rules address, parties are even more likely to appeal
where the rules are silent.
II. ARGUMENT
General Statutes § 7A-38.1 and the Rules of Mediated Settle-
ment Conferences require each party, or the party's substitute, to
come to the MSC with the authority to settle the dispute.71 The
legislation and accompanying rules fail to clarify the parties'
responsibilities in the negotiation process. This lack of clarity will
encourage additional litigation as participants seek to interpret
the statutory language and its underlying principles. Additional
litigation will defeat the underlying policy of the legislature by
increasing costs and reducing efficiency thereby decreasing satis-
faction with the process. The North Carolina Supreme Court can
avoid this result by defining the parties' duties and clarifying the
procedures for measuring compliance. Two possibilities are a good
faith duty to negotiate a settlement, or no duty beyond strict com-
pliance with the rules. The court should establish an objective
68. Id.
69. See supra note 66.
70. Can the party show up and refuse to negotiate? Must a party's claim that
it refused an offer because it was "deemed contrary to its best interests" be a
reasonable or honest belief? Can the party's representative satisfy the
requirements by having the authority to settle the dispute for a peppercorn? Can
the party's representative have no express authority to settle because the
principle believes there is no legal merit to the claim, or because of a desire to
litigate?
71. See supra note 63.
1996]
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duty of good faith, define how the court will measure compliance,
and how sanctions will be imposed.
A. Foundation of the Duty
The objectives of the MSC legislation - increased efficiency,
reduced costs, and the satisfaction of participants- mandate a duty
of good faith in the mediation process.72 Reducing cost and
increasing efficiency are intertwined objectives. Efficient dispute
resolution will result in lower costs. In voluntary mediation, par-
ticipation occurs because both parties desire to resolve the conflict
without litigation.73 A party who is forced to mediate may lack
this desire.74 Economic incentives hinged on an objective criteria
of good faith would provide motivation for parties to negotiate in
good faith.75 This "compelled motivation" will result in increased
settlements in cases where one party wishes to delay or avoid
resolution.
Another factor inhibiting efficiency and decreased costs is the
attorney's financial interests. The public policy of reducing costs
means reducing attorney fees. A more efficient process means less
possible hours billable to a client. Quick dispute resolution cou-
pled with client, involvement will also lead to smaller contingent
fees. MSC's promote quick settlements with mandatory client
involvement. Attorneys mandated to attend the MSC's are
required to promote a mechanism whose stated purpose opposes
most attorneys' economic self-interest. This creates a prima facie
conflict of interest.7 6 Economic incentives based on an objective
good faith standard would alleviate this conflict.
72. See supra note 28.
73. See Department of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 380 S.E.2d 265, 268 (Ga.
1989) (stressing the importance of the voluntary nature of mediation).
74. At least one commentator has observed that one party to a conflict is often
in favor of the status quo and will have no desire to resolve the conflict, therefor
it makes no sense to mandate the party's participation in mediation. Andrea
Nelle, Making Mediation Mandatory: A Proposed Framework, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 287, 294-95 (1992). This conclusion is questionable. It means that
it makes more sense for all sides and the court to incur additional costs and
forego a possible resolution because of one party's desires to prolong litigation.
This perspective contradicts the public policies behind § 7A-38: improving the
overall costs, efficiency and satisfaction of the process.
75. An efficient method for providing an economic incentive will be further
developed. See discussion infra parts II.B. and II.C.
76. Nelle, supra note 74, at 295-96. While mandating mediation will
overcome an attorney's self-interested avoidance of mediation, the effectiveness
of mediation "depends largely on the content and enforcement of the duty to
292 [Vol. 18:281
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Each attorney in a court appointed MSC should be held to a
duty of good faith. The public policies behind coopting mediation
into the adversarial process are advanced only when the parties
make an effort to resolve their disputes. Attorneys involved in
court-mandated mediation owe a duty to uphold this process and
to use it for its legitimate purposes.7 7 Attorneys owe an additional
duty as negotiators to deal honestly with others. 78 It is profes-
sional misconduct for an attorney to engage in conduct that is dis-
honest or deceitful, or that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice. 79 The Rules of Professional Conduct hold attorneys to a
duty of honesty; 0 this duty can only be intensified when the attor-
ney is utilizing the court's mechanisms of justice. The duties of
honesty and good faith and the duty towards upholding the court's
process should be recognized and enforced by an objective stan-
dard during mediation.
mediate . . . ." Id. at 296. See also Alfini et al., supra note 42, at 329 (quoting
Professor Barkai).
77. "A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes
and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for
the legal system .... [Ilt is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process." N.C.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1994).
78. "As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but
consistent with requirements -of honest dealing with others." Id. (emphasis
added).
79. Id., Rule 1.2. "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
. .(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice;"
80. In the fiduciary context, a lawyer may have a general duty to seek
alternatives to litigation for a client.
Litigation. "Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to
compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal
winner is often a real loser-in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a
peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man.
There will still be business enough. Never stir up litigation. A worse
man can scarcely be found than one who does this.
J. Robert McClure Jr., On the Practice of Law, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1990, at 98
(excerpts from a Lincoln autobiography). Abe Lincoln's advice on a lawyer's
honesty:
Let no young man choosing the law for a calling for a moment yield to
the popular belief-resolve to be honest at all events; and if in your own
judgment you cannot be an honest lawyer, resolve to be honest without
being a lawyer. Choose some other occupation, rather than one in the
choosing of which you do, in advance, consent to be a knave.
1996] 293
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Mediation is a forum for precontractual negotiation. Partici-
pants in an MSC seek to exchange a set of promises that will
resolve their conflict and that the court will enforce. Under the
common law, there is no duty to act in good faith when negotiating
a contract."' The traditional view is that parties should be pro-
vided the freedom to negotiate without risk of precontractual lia-
bility.82 The basis for this view is that
a party that enters negotiations in the hope of the gain that will
result from ultimate agreement bears the risk of whatever loss
results if the other party breaks off the negotiations. That loss
includes out-of-pocket costs .... All is hazarded on a successful
outcome of the negotiations; all is lost on failure.... This aleatory
view of negotiations rests upon a concern that limiting the free-
dom of negotiation might discourage parties from entering
negotiations.8
3
This traditional view should not be applied to court directed medi-
ation for three reasons. First, the "aleatory view"8 4 and concept of
"risk" is inapplicable when the venture is mandated by the court.
A party ordered to negotiate is not a fortuitous risk taker.
Second, two purposes of § 7A-38 are to reduce costs and
improve efficiency for participants and the court. The disap-
pointed party to the MSC does not bear the risk of failed negotia-
tion alone. The risk is "compelled," and all parties, including the
court itself, bear the increased costs of a failed negotiation. If a
compulsory MSC fails, dissatisfaction and total costs in terms of
time, effort, and dollars will be greater than if the MSC had not
been ordered. It is illogical to mandate a process to reduce costs
81. "Before the contract is signed, the parties confront each other with a
natural wariness. Neither expects the other to be particularly forthcoming, and
therefore there is no deception when one is not." Market St. Assoc. Ltd.
Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991). See also Haver v. Union
State Bank of Wautoma, 532 N.W.2d 456 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (No duty under
the U.C.C. for good faith in pre-contractual negotiation. Good faith only directs
attention to the parties' reasonable expectations and does not create independent
rights or duties.). But see Satellite Broadcasting Cable, Inc. v. Telefonica De
Espana, 807 F. Supp. 210 (D.P.R. 1992) (In Puerto Rico, "parties which
undertake negotiations of a contract are bound by a duty of good faith."). Id. at
216-17.
82. E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 CoLuM. L. REV. 217, 221
(1987).
83. Id.
84. "Aleatory transaction. An event dependent on a fortuitous or uncertain
happening." BLAcies LAw DICTIONARY 70 (6th ed. 1990).
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and increase efficiency and satisfaction, while not mandating par-
ticipation that accomplishes these objectives.8 5 Failure to man-
date conduct that promotes these objectives will often lead to the
opposite result.
An individual who is directed to mediate may often have
higher costs and lower satisfaction than if the MSC had not been
ordered. This will occur when the opposing party either wants to
preserve the status quo or when it uses the cost of litigation to
enhance questionable damages. In this second situation, an MSC
will actually increase the opposing sides "economic leverage" as
another cost is added to the equation. However, if parties are held
to a duty of negotiating towards a "just" resolution, the bad faith 6
party will have an incentive to bargain in good faith or will have to
bear the costs of their behavior. The cost of refusing to honestly
negotiate includes, at a minimum, all parties' cost of mediation
and possibly the costs of subsequent litigation. Enforcing the duty
by shifting costs must not impede the goals of reduced costs and
increased efficiency. 7
Third, the "concern" of inhibiting negotiations, which is the
foundation of the traditional view in contract theory, is entirely
misplaced in a process where the negotiations are mandatory.
The superior court judge's evaluation of the case, not the parties'
inhibitions, will decide whether mediation occurs. The traditional
view on precontractual liability is inappropriate in the context of
court-mandated MSC's, and is hostile to the public policies behind
§ 7A-38.88
85. But see Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (Policy
behind state code allowed the lower court to compel parties to attend mediation,
but did not allow the court to compel them to sit down, negotiate or settle the
dispute.).
86. Bad faith behavior should not be confused with an honest disagreement
on a material question of fact or on the status of the law. Parties negotiating in
good faith should be able to articulate the reasons behind their valuation of the
dispute, and thus be able to identify the reason(s) negotiation failed.
87. See discussion infra part II.C.
88. See Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During
Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SHLR 70 (1993). Discusses
the modem legal trends that support a heightened duty of good faith
and fair dealing in precontractual negotiations. Such trends include the
rise of the doctrine of good faith in the context of contract performance,
the recognition that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is not limited
solely to post-contractual dealings, the statutory use of the duty of good
faith, the application of the doctrine of good faith as a duty imposed by
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A good faith standard in mediation can also be demonstrated
in contract theory. Civil litigants enter into an implied-in-fact
contract with the court. s9 By paying fees and filing documents,
litigants manifest an intent to use the judicial process. By
accepting the fees and documents, and by docketing the case, the
court manifests an intent to provide its mechanisms of law and
justice for resolving the dispute. The court provides a valuable
service by agreeing to be a neutral arbiter. This contract with the
court is silent on duties owed and on whether there are any condi-
tions to the court's performance. The omitted provisions are sup-
plied by rules of law.90 The pertinent rule of law describing the
party's duty at an MSC merely addresses attendance.9 1 The court
may implicate a duty based on the parties' expectation or based on
principles of justice.92 It is likely that both the court and the party
law, the increasing application of ethics and morality in the law and the
decline of caveat emptor doctrine.
In order to show similarities between United States' and civil law's concept of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and of good faith disclosures, author
concludes with an analysis of Italian and German laws' requirement of good faith
in negotiations and contract formation. Id. at 77-78, 201-213.
89. When parties manifest their agreement by their conduct, the contract is
said to be implied in fact. JOSEPH D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CONTRACTS § 1-12 (3d. ed. 1987). "The distinction between this kind of contract
and a contract expressed in words is unimportant: both are true contracts formed
by a mutual manifestation of assent." Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 5, 19 (1979).
90. In contracting with the court, the majority of provisions are omitted
from the contract. There are two reasons why a party may tolerate an
omission in a contract. First, the party may have foreseen the problem
but made a conscious decision not to deal with it....
[A] reason why parties may fail to deal with these nonroutine
contingencies is that they are confident that the law will provide
reasonable terms if necessary. For this reason, much goes without
saying, especially in informal agreements. . . . If all terms were
expressly agreed to, even the simplest contracts would become
intolerably long.
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.15 at 541-42 (2d. ed. 1990). A party
contracting with the court to resolve a dispute, recognizes that there is a process
to follow and that the requirements for the conflict's resolution depend on
compliance with the rules and laws pertaining to the process.
91. See supra note 63.
92. Once the court determines that the parties have omitted the relevant
circumstance from the contract, it must supply a term to the contract that deals
with the case. FARNSWORTH, supra note 90, § 7.16 at 546. There are two basis
for supplying a term: actual expectations of the parties and basic principles of
justice. Id.
16
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expected each other to comply with the most efficient and expedi-
tious means to arrive at a just resolution. As discussed above,
mediation is most efficient when both parties undertake good faith
efforts to reach a resolution. When the court compels the individ-
ual to participate in a court process, it is just to expect the court to
regulate the process in the most efficient and economical means
possible.
B. Standards of Review
The North Carolina Supreme Court must define a clear stan-
dard of what constitutes good faith in a MSC order to promote the
public policies behind § 7A-38.1. Once a duty of good faith in
MSC's is established, a standard will have to be set for guiding
negotiating parties and the courts. Announcing the duty without
clear guidelines will require additional litigation to define the
scope of the duty. Additional litigation would frustrate the public
policies behind MSCs.
One commentator has identified at least six different judicial
standards for reviewing intent.93 The first is strict compliance
and absolute immunity.94 Under this analysis, the party only has
to abide by the letter of the rules. Under the current Rules, if all
the necessary individuals for the party are present with the
authority to settle, the party is immune from liability. The second
standard is that a party is liable for failing to act in subjective95
and objective 96 good faith.97 A subjective standard requires that
93. R. Randall Kelso, Three Years Hence: An Update on Filling Gaps in the
Supreme Court's Approach to Constitutional Review of Legislation, 36 S. TEx. L.
REV. 1, 40 (1995).
94. Id.
95. Good faith is usually used to refer to the individuals intent The U.C.C.
defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned,"
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-201(19) (1995), and implies it in every contract. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-1-203 (1995). See also the Uniform Fiduciary Act, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 32-2 (1991). It has also been defined as being faithful to one's duty or
obligation. Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 57 Cal.Rptr. 248, 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). In
the context here, "subjective" is used to distinguish it from the "objective"
standard of good faith.
96. The most familiar standard of objective good faith is in U.C.C. § 2-103 (b):
"Good faith" in the case of a merchant means "honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-2-103 (1986). North Carolina has shifted from a subjective good faith
standard to an objective standard for purposes of N.C. Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule
11. "The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances. This
standard is more stringent than the original good-faith formula and thus it is
1996] 297
17
Biller: Good Faith Mediation: Improving Efficiency, Costs, and Satisfacti
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
the party have the requisite subjective mental intent.98 "In con-
trast, an objective standard focuses on reasonable expectations
and the behavior of the reasonably prudent person."99 The third
standard is a pretext inquiry, whether the party lacked subjective
good faith. 10 0 The fourth standard is to determine whether there
was a lack of objective good faith.10 Did the party do what a rea-
sonably prudent individual would have done? The fifth standard
finds liability for a lack of subjective or objective good faith.'0 2
The sixth standard bases liability on what the actual facts are as
determined by the court, "without regard to what subjectively the
person knew, or objectively what the individual should have
known "... o103
A subjective good faith standard would not be conducive to
efficiency and lower costs. It would be easy for a disappointed
party to allege a lack of subjective good faith and difficult for a
court to determine.'0 4 Resolving the question would involve addi-
tional hearings and review of witnesses and evidence. It would
expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation." Turner
v. Duke, 325 N.C. 152, 164, 381 S.E.2d 706, 713 (1989). An objective standard is
used to determine whether a client has made a "reasonable inquiry" into the
validity of their pleadings;
[i]f, given the knowledge and information which can be imputed to a
party, a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances
would have terminated his or her inquiry and formed the belief that the
claim was warranted under existing law, then the party's inquiry will be
deemed objectively reasonable.
Bryson v. Sullivan, 330 N.C. 644, 661-62, 412 S.E.2d 327, 336 (1992). The same
standard is used to evaluate an attorney's conduct for purposes of Rule 11.
If an attorney's conduct appears to fall within the scope of Rule 11, the
court must first examine the action at issue according to a standard of
objective reasonableness. At this stage, the inquiry focuses only on
whether a reasonable attorney in like circumstances would believe his
actions to be factually and legally justified. If the standard of objective
reasonableness is not met, sanctions are mandatory.
Lyles v. K Mart Corp., 703 F. Supp. 435, 440 (W.D.N.C. 1989).
97. Kelso, supra note 93.
98. Id. at 39.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 40.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. For the same reasons, the federal and North Carolina courts found the
subjective standard ineffective for purposes of Rule 11 and switched to an
objective standard. Turner v. Duke, 325 N.C. 152, 163-64, 381 S.E.2d 706, 713.
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present questions of fact and require testimony from the mediator.
The possibility of mediator testimony would destroy the confiden-
tiality inherent in mediation. 10 5 The increased costs, decreased
efficiency, and threat to mediator confidentiality would more than
negate any gain that would result from a requirement of subjec-
tive good faith.
An objective good faith standard is determined by what a rea-
sonably prudent person would have known and done.1" 6 In the
context of negotiating a settlement, a reasonably prudent person's
behavior will usually be guided by economic rationality. A reason-
able party will negotiate a settlement based on the amount of per-
ceived damages balanced against the risks and costs of trial.
1 0 7
The objective value of the claim is best defined by what the trier of
fact determines after being presented with both sides of the evi-
dence. If a party refuses an offer that was reasonably within the
amount ultimately determined at final judgment, there is evi-
dence of an economically irrational decision. If a party refuses an
offer that was better than the amount determined at final judg-
ment, there is a presumption of economic irrationality. Assuming
that a reasonably prudent person is economically rational, a final
judgment that is less than or nearly the same as that offered at
the MSC creates a presumption of a failure to act in good faith.
This presumption should be overcome by clear and convincing evi-
dence of a good faith dispute over a legitimate question of law or
material fact. If the presumption is not rebutted, costs and attor-
ney fees, from the date of the offer, should be shifted onto the pre-
sumed bad-faith party.
In the context of mandatory MSCs, this objective standard is
a fact determinative presumption that is rebutted by objective
proof of good faith. The only evidence needed to determine the
presumption is the final offers of both sides at the mediation and
the value at final judgment. If the parties are negotiating in good
faith, they will possess articulated reasons substantiating their
valuation of the dispute. If the parties are unable, in good faith, to
negotiate a settlement, they should be able to identify where the
105. See, James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, And Hashing It Out: Is This The
End Of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 63-65 (1991); Mebane,
supra note 7, at 1868.
106. See supra note 96.
107. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 21.5 (4th ed. 1992)
(Economic analysis of deciding to settle. Demonstrates the key role anticipated
costs of litigation play, aside from the merits of the claim.).
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valuations of the dispute are irreconcilable. This process will
focus the parties on the underlying issue(s). If the issue is a rea-
sonable question of the law or a question of material fact, both
parties should offer the explanation to the court upon the MSC's
failure. Both parties should then be deemed to have participated
in good faith regardless of the ultimate decision. Determining the
reasonableness of the offered explanations should be left to the
discretion of the trial judge. The trial judge is in the best position
to determine how reasonable each side's beliefs were after consid-
ering the legal analysis and viewing the evidence.
A party can immediately submit to the court its objective good
faith reason for refusing what appears to be a rational offer.'0 s
Therefore, evidence used for rebutting the presumption should be
admitted after the MSC and before trial.
C. Economic Presumption
To avoid additional litigation and out of fairness to the par-
ties, the court should establish an economic bright line for the pre-
sumption that a party negotiated in bad faith.10 9 An economic
bright line would provide a clear, simple, low-cost and efficient
method of analysis. The entire process could be driven by a joint
affidavit from the parties stating their final offers at the close of
the failed MSC. Each party could attach a separate affidavit stat-
ing their objective reasons, if any, for rejecting the other side's
offer. These affidavits would be reviewed by the court upon final
judgment without need for motions, hearings, or additional evi-
dence. This suggested process would not threaten mediator neu-
trality and would not punish parties with legitimate disputes.
The method and implications of this analysis would be clear, effi-
108. If a party has a reason for wanting a public decision the court can be
informed and the MSC waived. If evidence is discovered after the MSC that
changes the worth of the claim, the court can be informed and the parties can
renegotiate. A duty to disclose material facts, analogous to the new Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, would reduce the possibility of the latter
occurrence.
109. In Wayne County, MI, parties may be directed to an information hearing.
The rules permit the court to impose costs and attorney fees on the party who
rejects a unanimous recommendation of the hearing panel but does not improve
on it by at least ten percent at trial. ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 7, § 7:04, at
17-18 & nn. 2, 3 (Discussing Wayne County, Mich Local Court Rule 403.15-
404.16 and Mich Gen Court Rule 316.7).
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cient and require little additional effort by the court. 110 It would
provide a strong and clear economic incentive for parties to make
good faith efforts in assessing and making offers at MSCs.
III. CONCLUSION
The adoption of a good faith standard for mandatory MSC's
may not "transform" ' the adversarial process, but if done care-
fully, it will improve efficiency, reduce cost and increase public
satisfaction with the civil court process. Such a standard simply
requires parties to act honestly and reasonably towards resolving
their dispute before incurring the costs of the adversarial system.
Greater efficiency, lower costs and higher satisfaction may not
change North Carolinians' perception of lawyers, but it would be a
step in the right direction.
Tony Biller
110. Sanctions would be subject to a three part appellate review. The first
inquiry would be whether the rejected offer fell within the economic bright line.
If the offer did, the second inquiry would be whether the rejecting party provided
a legitimate reason for their rejection. The trial judge's determination on the
legitimacy of the reason should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
The sanctions imposed would also be subject to an abuse of discretion standard.
This review is more simple than the bifurcated appellate review of mandatory
Rule 11 sanctions. Under Rule 11, the appellate court reviews de novo the
decision to grant or deny sanctions; this review is determined by
(1) whether the trial court's conclusions of law support its judgment or
determination,(2) whether the trial court's conclusions of law are
supported by findings of fact, and(3) whether the findings of fact are
supported by a sufficiency of the evidence.
Turner v. Duke, 325 N.C. 152, 165, 381 S.E.2d 706, 714. If the appellate court
finds these three factors in favor of the lower court, the lower court's decision is
upheld. Id. The reviewing court then uses an abuse of discretion standard in
reviewing sanctions that were imposed. Id.
111. [I]f people are able to find ways of working through conflict that
involve acting with somewhat greater strength and compassion, and
with somewhat less weakness and self-absorption, this is
transformation. Perhaps this is possible at least to some degree much
more often than we think; and perhaps this is what people want -
much more often than we think.Maybe lawyers are even interested in
providing or helping people to achieve this much more often than we
think.
Alfini et al., supra note 42, at 331 (Quoting Professor Baruch Bush).
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